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LANE V. FRANKS: THE SUPREME COURT FRANKLY FAILS TO GO 
FAR ENOUGH 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of the First Amendment in the public workplace is one of high 
importance, as nearly twenty-two million Americans are employed by 
governmental entities.1 Unlike the broad constitutional protections granted to 
private citizen speech, the Supreme Court has constrained public employees’ 
First Amendment freedoms.2 In June 2014, though, the Supreme Court 
unusually, yet unanimously, bolstered the constitutional rights of public 
employees by taking an employee-friendly stance in the freedom of speech 
realm.3 The Court took cautious steps to define the blurred line established by 
its own precedent on what constitutes “citizen speech” protected under the 
First Amendment versus constitutionally unprotected “employee speech.”4 In 
Lane v. Franks, the focus of this Note, the Supreme Court relaxed the standard 
public employee speech was previously held to, and it reinforced the 
importance of compelled testimony by ever-so-slightly expanding First 
Amendment protection to public employees testifying under subpoena about 
matters not within their ordinary job duties;5 however, the decision did not go 
quite far enough. 
While Lane v. Franks first appeared to be a victory for public employees, 
the decision certainly has its drawbacks. The decision effectually left lower 
courts in the dark,6 and both public employees and employers confused on the 
boundaries of constitutional protection.7 While Lane v. Franks tried to redefine 
ambiguous precedent, it failed to do so clearly and effectively. Moreover, the 
Court’s narrow holding leaves too many types of speech unprotected, such as 
 
 1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL 
SUMMARY REPORT: 2013 2 (2014), http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/2013_summary_report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/63F4-T93U]. 
 2. W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 313 
(2001). 
 3. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2014). 
 4. Id. at 2378–80. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Catherine Fisk, Guest Blog: Catherine Fisk on Lane v. Franks, HAMILTON AND GRIFFIN 
ON RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-blog-catherine-fisk-on-lane-v-
franks/ [http://perma.cc/5PM6-QGC4]. 
 7. Katie Jo Baumgardner, Note, Lane v. Franks, 90 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 52 
(2015). 
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voluntary testimony and speech that falls within the course of one’s ordinary 
job duties.8 A citizen’s First Amendment protections should not have to be 
checked at the door merely because he or she is employed by a state actor, and 
public employees should be further protected from potential retaliation. 
Part I of this Note discusses the applicable portions of the Constitution and 
Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence that laid the foundation for the 
Lane decision. Part II discusses the circuit split that existed concerning the 
constitutional protections of public employee testimony before the Supreme 
Court’s attempt at resolution in 2014. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lane v. Franks, the predominate focus of this Note. Part IV 
provides a critique of the Court’s decision in Lane. Finally, Part V proposes a 
modified, and preferable, test for the Court to employ in determining whether a 
public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected. 
I.  THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AT DRAWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINE BETWEEN 
CITIZEN SPEECH AND EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
A. Constitutional and Statutory Freedom of Speech Protections 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”9 The First 
Amendment limits the government, and its entities, from regulating the speech 
of its citizens.10 However, while the First Amendment is a fundamental right 
and is considered one of our nation’s most prized values,11 the right is not 
absolute, and there are abundant types of speech that escape the provision’s 
scope.12 One notable exception is the one granted to public employees. While 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence grants public employees 
some protection, “their speech is afforded a lower degree of constitutional 
protection as compared with the speech of private citizens.”13 These narrowed 
rights become particularly controversial when, because of their speech, an 
employee faces adverse employment consequences or termination.14 
 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 10. See id. 
 11. E.g., SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1212 (N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he 
right to free expression is one of this Nation’s most cherished civil liberties.”). 
 12. Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—the Roberts Court, the First Amendment, 
and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 417–18 (2013) (listing examples of exceptions, 
such as speech used to further a criminal conspiracy, speech that amounts to treason, defamation 
or libelous speech, and speech that is deemed obscene). 
 13. Wendel, supra note 2, at 344. 
 14. See David L. Hudson Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 FIRST 
REPS. 1, 4 (2002). In response to retaliation, many public employees seek redress under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which in itself contains no rights but provides a private cause of action for citizens 
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B. Key Cases Outlining Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence 
For many years, “the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had 
no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—
including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”15 
However, in 1968, that officially changed when the Supreme Court decided 
Pickering v. Board of Education.16 In Pickering, the Court recognized that 
public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason 
of their employment.17 Rather, the First Amendment protection of a public 
employee’s speech depends on a careful balance between the interests of the 
employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern, and the 
interests of the State as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.18 
In Pickering, the plaintiff was a public school teacher whose employment 
was terminated when he wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper 
criticizing the school board’s proposed funding plans.19 The Supreme Court 
concluded the public school teacher’s speech was constitutionally protected 
under the First Amendment by way of the newly created “Pickering balancing 
test.”20 Under the test, two inquiries are made.21 First, courts must ascertain 
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, which 
is a two-pronged inquiry.22 The first question serves as merely a threshold. If 
the threshold is not satisfied, the analysis ends, and the speech is not afforded 
First Amendment protection.23 However, if the threshold is met, and the 
employee did speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the analysis 
 
deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution,” such as the First 
Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
 15. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983). Up until the middle of the twentieth 
century, there was no constitutional bar to a governmental employer prohibiting speech 
considered detrimental to the employer’s best interests. See generally id.; Wood v. Georgia, 370 
U.S. 375, 395 (1962) (finding county sheriff’s letter criticizing a local judge’s ruling was 
protected expression because it “did not present a danger to the administration of justice”). 
 16. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968). 
 17. Id. at 568; see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (reiterating 
public employees cannot be constitutionally forced to surrender First Amendment rights afforded 
to all citizens based on their employment). 
 18. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (This balance takes into account 
the First Amendment’s primary goal: the full protection of speech involving matters of public 
concern as well as the “practical realities involved in the administration of a government office”). 
 19. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
 20. Id. at 568. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); Connick, 461 U.S. at 144–
48 (exemplifying the dual inquiry Pickering balancing test). 
 23. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
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proceeds to the second inquiry: the balancing test. The Court then determined 
whether the government employer had an adequate justification for treating the 
employee differently than any other member of the general public,24 weighing 
the employee’s interest against the employer’s interest. Under the Pickering 
balancing test, so long as the employee is speaking as a citizen about matters of 
public concern, only restrictions that are necessary for the employer to operate 
efficiently and effectively, and avoid disruption, are permitted.25 
While an individual has obvious constitutional rights and interests in one’s 
speech, the government also has important interests at stake. The government 
as a sovereign has few legitimate reasons to regulate speech,26 but the 
government as an employer has a multitude of reasons to do so. When 
functioning as an employer, the government has the same interests as all other 
employers,27 such as the maintenance of harmony in the workplace, the 
maintenance of discipline, the need for employee loyalty, and the need for an 
employee to keep confidences.28 These governmental interests make even 
more sense in consideration of the overall public interest because the public 
has a strong interest in the services the government provides. Therefore, the 
public aligns with the government when the government is acting as an 
employer and the speech at issue would disrupt those services. The interplay of 
these interests (that of the employee, the employer, and the public) explains 
why the Court’s framework began evolving with the institution of a balancing 
test under Pickering. 
While Pickering left some matters unclear, such as the definition of a 
citizen speaking on a matter of public concern and its application of the 
analytical framework on workplace speech,29 the Supreme Court handed down 
several other cases in the coming years to provide clarification. Givhan v. 
Western Line Consolidated School District defined the First Amendment 
protection to private conversations involving a matter of public concern.30 The 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. Since the letter to the editor concerning the school budget 
constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and it did not impede the teacher’s proper 
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or interfere with the regular operation of the 
schools, the teacher’s speech alone could not serve as the basis for termination. Id. at 572–73. 
 26. When the government is sovereign, the public interest dictates that speech be allowed 
unless it is truly dangerous. For example, screaming “fire” in a crowded movie theatre. 
 27. Public Employer May Remove Employees Acting in Direct Contravention of Employer’s 
Interests, 2 NO. 10 NEV. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (July 1997). 
 28. See generally Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 909 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing various 
interests of the government functioning as an employer). 
 29. See id. at 574. 
 30. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (finding a school 
teacher’s grievance on discriminatory policies to her supervisor in private was speaking as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern and deserving of First Amendment protection); see also 
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Court made it apparent that speech not directly related to an employee’s 
ordinary work responsibilities would likely be protected.31 However, in 
Connick v. Myers, the Court looked to the content, form, and context of the 
speech to determine whether the speech was considered a matter of public 
concern.32 There, the Court was faced with a matter that pertained directly to 
the employee’s job duties, and it hinted that government employees speaking 
directly about their employment may receive different treatment.33 Connick 
indicated that if the content involves a larger audience, possibly outside the 
workplace, the speech is more likely to be protected.34 If the speech appears 
more like a disgruntled employee complaining about personal employment 
issues, the less likely the speech will be protected.35 Despite some 
clarifications by the Court, the precise definition of “speech involving a matter 
of public concern” continued to remain unclear for decades to come. 
After nearly forty years of faithfully applying the Pickering balancing test, 
the Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion and added a new, and 
significant, wrinkle to the analysis.36 In Garcetti, a district attorney claimed 
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment when he was reassigned for 
writing a memorandum recommending a case be dismissed after uncovering 
alleged governmental misconduct surrounding a search warrant.37 While 
regarding Pickering as a “useful starting point,”38 Garcetti v. Ceballos added 
an additional threshold inquiry by distinguishing between government 
employees speaking as members of the public and government employees 
speaking while performing their official job duties.39 In effect, the Court 
usurped the previously undefined “as a citizen” language from Pickering and 
provided it with separate analytical teeth. The Court held if the speech is made 
“pursuant to” the public employee’s “official duties,” then the employee was 
not speaking as a citizen, and Garcetti’s new threshold inquiry is left 
unsatisfied.40 The consequence is that the employee’s speech is left 
unprotected, even if the employee can satisfy the previously established 
 
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 388–89 (1987) (deeming an employee’s comment 
regarding the attempted assassination of President Nixon to be citizen speech). 
 31. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16. 
 32. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
 33. Id. However, the Court did not expressly reach whether the employee’s speech 
constituted citizen speech, as it was resolved based on the speech not constituting “a matter of 
public concern.” Id. 
 34. See id. at 147. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 37. Id. at 414–15. 
 38. Id. at 417. 
 39. Id. at 421. 
 40. Id. 
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Pickering balancing test.41 Thus, after Garcetti, even if the speech is an 
expression of public concern the employee held in his or her capacity as a 
private citizen, if it is voiced pursuant to the employee’s official duties, the 
First Amendment no longer provides a safeguard from employer discipline.42 
This has since been referred to as the “official duties” doctrine.43 The Garcetti 
Court granted public employers substantial discretion in running their 
respective services, and it reasoned that when a citizen accepts a government 
employment position, the citizen by necessity also accepts some restraints on 
his or her freedoms in order to maintain proper functioning of government 
offices.44 
Under this newly created “official duties” doctrine, the Garcetti Court 
identified whether the statements were actually made pursuant to the 
employee’s official job responsibilities as the “controlling factor.”45 Since the 
district attorney prepared the memorandum at issue while performing the tasks 
he was compensated to perform, the Court determined his statement was made 
as a public employee pursuant to his official duties.46 Therefore, he was 
speaking as an employee, not as a citizen, and the First Amendment did not 
insulate him from discipline.47 
The Garcetti decision created strong division across the Court. Indeed, the 
majority opinion, which was joined by only five justices, was countered with 
three dissenting opinions.48 Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer 
all contended that the majority’s holding went too far in setting forth a per se 
rule and provided the employer with too much protection at the expense of the 
employee’s constitutional rights.49 Alternatively, Justice Stevens asserted that 
“[t]he proper answer to the question ‘whether the First Amendment protects a 
 
 41. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 44. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 421–22 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant 
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline . . . . 
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply 
reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or 
created.”). 
 45. Id. at 421. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 422. 
 48. Id. at 412, 426, 427, 444. 
 49. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426, 446 (Stevens, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
428–29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A] government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to 
an individual of speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for categorically 
discounting a speaker’s interest in commenting on a matter of public concern just because the 
government employs him.”). 
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government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties’ . . . is ‘[s]ometimes,’ not ‘[n]ever.’”50 The dissents 
also emphasized that there is not a categorical difference between citizen 
speech and employee speech, and constitutional protection should not hinge on 
such an arbitrary distinction.51 It was evident the Garcetti Court could not 
present a united front, which likely contributed to the confusion concerning 
how to apply the new standard and a subsequent split among the circuits. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN NEED OF RESOLUTION 
In the years following the Garcetti decision, many lower courts struggled 
with its application.52 It has proven difficult to determine whether speech falls 
within an employee’s official duties and is left unprotected, or if the speech is 
otherwise subject to the First Amendment.53 
One activity that has proven particularly problematic in application is a 
public employee’s in-court testimony.54 On this issue, the circuit courts have 
interpreted Supreme Court precedent differently.55 The Third Circuit took the 
position that any subpoenaed testimony offered in court, even if it relates to an 
investigation conducted as part of an employee’s official duties, is protected 
speech because “[w]hen a government employee testifies truthfully, s/he is not 
‘simply performing his or her job duties;’ rather, the employee is acting as a 
citizen and is bound by the dictates of the court and the rules of evidence.”56 
The Third Circuit extended this protection further to include voluntary 
testimony as a way to check potential retaliation for truthful testimony and in 
 
 50. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 427, 430. 
 52. Fisk, supra note 6. 
 53. See Looney v. Black, 702 F.3d 701, 718 (2d Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether speech 
was made ‘pursuant to’ one’s official job duties, it is necessary to ascertain whether the speech at 
issue ‘owed its existence to [the plaintiff’s] job duties and was made in furtherance of those 
duties.’”); Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Our Court has explained that, 
even if a public employee’s speech ‘is not required by, or included in, [his] job description, or 
[made] in response to a request by the employer,’ he speaks as an employee and not as a citizen if 
the speech is ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to ‘properly execute his duties.’”); 
Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e must ask whether the speech 
is part of the employee’s ‘daily professional activities.’”). 
 54. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014). 
 55. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Chrzanowski, 725 
F.3d at 736; Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013). But see 
Fisk, supra note 6 (“The Eleventh Circuit is alone among the circuits in holding that an employee 
can be fired for testifying truthfully pursuant to a subpoena.”). 
 56. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (internal citation omitted). A police officer testifying for the 
prosecution in a police corruption case received First Amendment protection because every 
citizen, including government employees, has a duty to comply with the rule of law and to testify 
truthfully in court proceedings. Id. at 224, 231. 
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order to preserve the truth-seeking process.57 The Seventh Circuit took a 
similar approach, finding testimony of a public employee against his 
supervisor in a criminal proceeding protected as First Amendment speech.58 
The Seventh Circuit first applied the “official duties” doctrine of Garcetti and 
the Pickering balance test, but it further found the employee’s speech deserved 
constitutional protection whether it was part of an employee’s duties or not.59 
Other circuits have considered whether the courtroom testimony of a 
public employee is protected under the First Amendment without going 
beyond a strict application of the “official duties” doctrine of Garcetti and the 
Pickering balancing test. The Ninth Circuit held testimony of a domestic 
violence counselor was protected under the First Amendment because the 
counselor was not directed to testify by the employer, but rather was 
subpoenaed and testified to a matter of public concern.60 Similarly, the Second 
Circuit held in-court testimony offered by a Department of Social Services 
employee was not protected speech because the employee was not subpoenaed 
but voluntarily testified about information she obtained through performing her 
official employee duties.61 Additionally, the employee identified herself as 
such, and she failed to “distinguish her personal views from those of [her 
employer].”62 
Ultimately, the various district and appellate courts were struggling with 
what exactly it means to speak pursuant to one’s employment. Does it mean 
that the act of speaking in this precise form is required by one’s job? Does it 
mean speaking about things related to one’s workplace? Does it mean speaking 
about things one learns through one’s work? The varied applications of 
Garcetti and Pickering in courts throughout the country led to discrepancies in 
 
 57. Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886–87 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 58. Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 736; see also Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
 59. Chrzanowski, 725 F.3d at 740–41. The court found testimony given pursuant to a 
subpoena is protected because the rationale behind the Garcetti “official duties” doctrine would 
not be properly served by allowing an employer to affect the testimony of an employee under 
oath. Id. 
 60. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1104–06 (9th Cir. 2011). The court 
also considered that the counselor was testifying about someone other than a patient he treated, 
and the only evidence in the record of the counselor’s job duties was his job description, which 
included nothing about testifying in court. Id. 
 61. Kiehle v. Cty. of Cortland, 486 F. App’x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Bearss v. 
Wilton, 445 F. App’x 400, 403–04 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding testimony of a public employee was 
unprotected because the employee’s testimony concerned her job performance and “[was] 
motivated by personal interest in responding to criticism of her job performance and [was] not 
motivated by a desire to ‘advance a public purpose,’” and thus fell within the employee’s official 
duties). 
 62. Kiehle, 486 F. App’x at 224. 
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both holdings and reasoning, practically begging the Supreme Court to provide 
clarification. 
III.  LANE V. FRANKS 
A. Facts of Lane v. Franks 
Faced with pronounced division among the circuits, the Supreme Court 
confronted the issue of whether the First Amendment protects a public 
employee offering compelled court testimony in Lane v. Franks.63 The case 
concerns Petitioner Edward Lane (“Lane”) who served as the director of 
Central Alabama Community College’s (CACC) Community Intensive 
Training for Youth (CITY) Program, a statewide program for underprivileged 
youth.64 While conducting an audit of the program’s finances, Lane learned 
Suzanne Schmitz (“Schmitz”), an Alabama state representative, was on the 
program’s payroll but did not regularly report to work or perform any external 
work for the program.65 After internally raising his concerns to his superiors, 
Lane attempted to rectify the situation by confronting Schmitz who refused to 
comply and continued to be absent from CACC’s offices.66 Lane then 
unilaterally terminated Schmitz’s employment with CACC, ignoring warnings 
from both CACC’s attorney and president, Steve Franks (“Franks”), that doing 
so could involve negative repercussions for both Lane and the school.67 
Shortly thereafter, the FBI began investigating Schmitz’s employment with 
CITY and contacted Lane for information to aid their investigation.68 Pursuant 
to subpoena, Lane testified on behalf of the prosecution in Schmitz’s case 
before a grand jury in 2006 and then again at a federal criminal trial in 2008,69 
relating to charges that included mail fraud and fraud involving a program 
receiving federal funds.70 Lane testified to the circumstances and events that 
precipitated his termination of Schmitz in the grand jury proceedings and both 
criminal trials.71 This information consisted predominantly of information 
 
 63. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014). 
 64. Id. at 2375. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 69. Id. at 2375–76. Lane also testified at the second criminal trial of Schmitz in February 
2009, when she was retried after the first jury failed to reach a verdict. This testimony came after 
his termination from CITY, which occurred in January 2009. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2375; see also United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(alleging Schmitz had collected $177,251.82 in federal funds despite performing “little or no 
work for the program, generat[ing] virtually no services or work product, and rarely even 
appear[ing] for work . . . .”). 
 71. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. 
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Lane obtained through the audit he conducted in his official capacity as 
CITY’s director.72 
Just a few months after the conclusion of the first trial, Lane was fired by 
CACC.73 In 2011, Lane commenced an action in response to his termination 
against CACC and Franks, alleging he was improperly retaliated against in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on his testimony before the grand jury, 
which he contended constituted speech protected by the First Amendment.74 
B. Procedural Posture 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 
granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified 
immunity.75 The district court relied on Garcetti, which held that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,” in determining Lane’s 
speech was not protected by the First Amendment, and thus there was no 
viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.76 The district court stated that since Lane 
obtained the information he testified about in his capacity as the director of 
CITY, his speech was considered part of his official duties and was not speech 
made as a citizen involving a public concern.77 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling after 
finding no reversible error,78 and also relying extensively on Garcetti.79 The 
Eleventh Circuit concluded Lane testified as an employee, and not as a citizen, 
because his testimony concerned his investigation of the termination of 
Schmitz, which occurred while he was acting pursuant to his official job 
responsibilities.80 Relying on its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated 
that even if the speech (the subpoenaed testimony) itself was not part of the 
employee’s official duties, Lane is left unprotected by the First Amendment if 
the speech “‘owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional 
responsibilities’ and is ‘a product that the employer itself has commissioned or 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2376. The president of CACC, Steve Franks, initially laid off twenty-nine 
employees with three years of service or less, including Lane, to accommodate budget shortfalls. 
However, Franks rescinded all but two of the terminations just days later, one of which was 
Lane’s. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., No. CV-11-BE-0883-M, 2012 WL 5289412, at *12 
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2012). 
 76. Id. at *10 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 710 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 79. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376. 
 80. Lane, 523 F. App’x at 712. 
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created.’”81 Therefore, the fact that “Lane testified about his official activities 
pursuant to a subpoena and in the litigation context, in and of itself, does not 
bring Lane’s speech within the protection of the First Amendment.”82 Nor did 
the court find relevant that Lane’s job description did not include testifying at 
criminal trials, finding the most pertinent fact to be that his testimony only 
touched on acts he performed in his official capacity as CITY’s director.83 
Lane then appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari84 to “resolve 
discord” among the circuits as to whether a public employee may be 
terminated for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of 
their ordinary job duties.85 
C. Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court overwhelmingly disagreed with the lower courts on 
the First Amendment issue, holding a public employee who, outside the course 
of his ordinary job responsibilities, provides truthful testimony at trial pursuant 
to a subpoena is protected by the First Amendment from employer discipline.86 
Justice Sotomayor, writing the majority opinion for a unanimous Court, 
initially set out the basics of public employee free speech jurisprudence.87 
“[C]itizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public 
employment.”88 Rather, the protection depends on the balance between the 
employee and employer’s interests, as set forth in Pickering.89 
The Lane Court added its voice to the existing Pickering and Garcetti 
frameworks governing public employee speech. The first inquiry, whether the 
speech in question––here, Lane’s compelled testimony––is speech as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern, remained largely the same.90 However, whether 
the speech is “pursuant to” the employee’s ordinary job duties was further 
defined than it had been previously in Garcetti. Seemingly without hesitation, 
the Court declared that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee 
 
 81. Id. at 711 (quoting Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009)). 
 82. Id. at 712. 
 83. Id. While Lane’s speech was not part of his regular duties, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned 
it was based on activities he engaged in within the scope of his official responsibilities as director 
of CITY, excluding it from the purview of citizen speech. Id. 
 84. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2374–75, 2379. However, despite finding Lane is entitled to First Amendment 
protection, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts based on the existence of qualified 
immunity for Franks in his individual capacity. Id. at 2383. 
 87. Id. at 2377–79. 
 88. Id. at 2374. 
 89. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374. 
 90. Id. at 2378. As did the final inquiry concerning whether the government could present 
any countervailing interest to tip the scale in its favor. Id. at 2380–81. 
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outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First 
Amendment purposes,” even when the testimony concerns his public 
employment or information obtained during that employment.91 
1. Citizen Speech or Employee Speech 
The Supreme Court limited the reach of Garcetti’s “pursuant to” standard 
by asking instead whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope of an 
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”92 Specifically, 
the Court articulated the speech compelled by subpoena certainly was not 
within Lane’s ordinary job duties as a program supervisor, and it instead 
qualified as citizen speech.93 In finding to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit 
improperly ignored the fact that sworn testimony is the “quintessential 
example” of citizen speech since “[a]nyone who testifies in court bears an 
obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”94 Anyone 
testifying, including a public employee, has an independent obligation to be 
truthful, rendering sworn testimony speech as a citizen, distinct from speech 
made purely in the capacity as a public employee.95 
Furthermore, the Court criticized the Eleventh Circuit for improperly 
interpreting Garcetti too broadly in concluding Lane did not speak as a citizen, 
and instead as a government employee, when testifying.96 The mere fact that 
Lane learned of the subject matter of the proffered testimony in the course of 
his employment with CACC does not require the speech be treated as 
employee speech rather than citizen speech.97 Garcetti said absolutely nothing 
to that effect.98 Garcetti’s critical inquiry is whether the speech is within the 
scope of, or required as part of, an employee’s ordinary duties, not whether it 
merely concerns those duties or whether the subject matter of the speech was 
discovered in the course of those duties.99 A public employee’s speech, which 
just “relates to” his or her job, or is based on “information learned” in the 
course of fulfilling one’s job, is within the scope of First Amendment 
protection so long as it involves a matter of public concern.100 Therefore, even 
though Lane acquired the information he testified to throughout the course of 
 
 91. Id. at 2378. 
 92. Id. at 2379. 
 93. Id. at 2378–79. 
 94. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379; see Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 712 
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding it immaterial that Lane spoke “pursuant to a subpoena and in the 
litigation context”). 
 95. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378–80. 
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his employment, his official duties did not include providing sworn testimony, 
and his testimony thus should appropriately be characterized as citizen 
speech.101 
The Supreme Court went on to reiterate the important policy 
considerations behind its decision.102 There is a “special value” held by speech 
of public employees relating to their employment because those employees 
have inside knowledge on matters of public concern.103 Based on their inside 
acquisition of information, “it is essential that [public employees] be able to 
speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”104 
Moreover, the Court recognizes the heightened importance in this context: 
public corruption.105 
It would be antithetical to our jurisprudence to conclude that the very kind of 
speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public officials––speech by public 
employees regarding information learned through their employment––may 
never form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation claim. Such a rule 
would place public employees who witness corruption in an impossible 
position, torn between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to 
avoid retaliation and keep their jobs.106 
Therefore, in light of these important judicial principles, it is apparent that 
Lane’s sworn testimony qualifies as citizen speech and not as employee speech 
within the ordinary course of his job description.107 
2. Matter of Public Concern 
The second inquiry performed by the Court was whether the speech dealt 
with a matter of public concern.108 Speech incorporates public concern when it 
relates “to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community” 
or is “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”109 
Lane’s testimony involved the malfeasance of a state legislator in connection 
with the misuse of public funds.110 Since this was a classic case of 
whistleblowing about public corruption, the testimony was surely a matter of 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 2379–80. 
 103. Id. at 2379. 
 104. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 572 
(1968)); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 
U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (observing many categories of public employees “are uniquely qualified to 
comment” on “matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large”). 
 105. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2380. 
 109. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011)). 
 110. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. 
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public concern.111 Additionally, the inquiry relies on the “‘content, form, and 
context’ of the speech.”112 Since the form and context of the speech was sworn 
testimony in a judicial proceeding, the Court’s conclusion that the speech 
involved a public concern was bolstered.113 
3. Adequate Governmental Justification 
However, Lane’s testimony is not categorically entitled to protection under 
the First Amendment merely because it is citizen speech on a matter of public 
concern.114 The final question is whether the government provided “‘an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other 
member of the public.’”115 While government employers often have legitimate 
interests, including promoting efficiency and integrity, and maintaining proper 
discipline, the showing of a stronger interest may be required if the employee’s 
speech involves a substantial matter of public concern.116 Here, the defendants 
never seriously argued that the balance should tip in their favor.117 
Subsequently, there was no arguable countervailing governmental interest 
whatsoever that would justify Lane’s firing.118 Due to the total lack of a 
governmental interest in this case, the Court held Lane’s speech was entitled to 
First Amendment protection.119 
D. Concurrence Places Limitations on Majority’s Holding 
However, the concurring opinion authored by Justice Thomas, and joined 
by Justice Scalia and Justice Alito, rationalized that the answer to the question 
presented, whether a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern when testifying under oath outside the scope of his or her ordinary job 
responsibilities, requires merely a straightforward application of Garcetti.120 
Justice Thomas explained that, under Garcetti, “when a public employee 
speaks ‘pursuant to’ his official duties, he is not speaking ‘as a citizen,’ and 
 
 111. Id. at 2380; see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (stating public 
employees are uniquely qualified to comment on matters concerning governmental policies that 
are of interest to the public at large). 
 112. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). 
 116. Id. at 2381. 
 117. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 (stating respondents did not even attempt to assert Lane’s 
testimony was erroneous, or that confidential or privileged information was unnecessarily 
disclosed in the testimony). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2383 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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First Amendment protection is unavailable.”121 Here, the concurrence argues 
by deduction that Lane spoke as a citizen, and not as an employee, because he 
did not testify as part of an employment responsibility, as his job duties did not 
include testifying in court proceedings.122 The concurrence goes to great 
lengths to reiterate that this holding only applies to factual situations in which 
the testimony provided by the employee is not pursuant to the employee’s 
direct job duties.123 Therefore, the Court leaves the important question 
unresolved of whether a public employee speaking within the scope of his or 
her job description, as is so commonly required of lab technicians, police 
officers, and investigators, is afforded similar constitutional protection.124 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: LANE FALLS SHORT 
A. The Holding Ultimately Gets It Right 
Before addressing the abundant shortcomings of the Court’s opinion in 
Lane v. Franks, it is important to address its achievements. In a rare unanimous 
decision expanding an employee’s constitutional rights,125 the Court correctly 
laid down protection for employees abiding by a citizen duty of utmost 
importance: providing truthful testimony under subpoena.126 Almost every 
justice, including Justice Kennedy, the author of Garcetti,127 seemed deeply 
troubled by the idea that a government employee subpoenaed to testify is faced 
with three choices: refuse to testify and be held in contempt, testify falsely and 
commit perjury, or testify truthfully and be terminated.128 By resolving this 
dispute in favor of Lane, the Court rightly sends an important message that we, 
as a nation, highly value testimony given in a court of law.129 The majority 
opinion even goes to great lengths to explicitly relay this policy.130 
The holding is also sufficiently narrow and confined that it manages to 
protect subpoenaed public employees without imposing any additional burden 
on government employers. This is because while the Court is correct in 
recognizing the value of unfettered, truthful testimony in court proceedings, 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 2384. Likewise, through implication by silence, the Court also leaves unresolved 
the constitutional protection given to those who voluntary provide testimony versus those who 
testify under subpoena. 
 125. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Supreme Court’s 2013-2014 Labor and Employment Law 
Decisions: Consensus at the Court, 18 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 176 (2014). 
 126. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 127. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 412 (2006). 
 128. Fisk, supra note 6. 
 129. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378–80. 
 130. Id. at 2380. 
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this result required little more than an application of Garcetti v. Ceballos.131 
Lane testified in a manner that was neither pursuant to his job duties nor done 
to fulfill a work responsibility. The Eleventh Circuit misconstrued Garcetti’s 
“pursuant to” standard to broadly include anything that was uncovered through 
the employee’s line of work when finding Lane’s testimony unprotected.132 
Since Lane’s ordinary job duties did not include testifying at criminal trials, he 
spoke “as a citizen” and was entitled to constitutional protection from 
discipline, even under the Garcetti standard.133 Therefore, while regarded as a 
major achievement for public employees,134 the Court did little more than 
apply its own precedent. 
B. The Court’s Reasoning Was Largely Incomplete and Unfounded 
Lane v. Franks was the first chance for the Supreme Court to confront 
many of the unresolved questions following Garcetti v. Ceballos. However, 
while Lane v. Franks clarifies a few contours and boundaries of Garcetti’s 
holding, the Supreme Court left many important questions unanswered. Lane 
reiterates a public employer cannot discipline an employee for providing 
“truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his 
ordinary job responsibilities,”135 but the Court fails to clear up other 
ambiguities of its own precedent, instead electing to leave those issues for a 
later date.136 In this regard, the Court missed a significant opportunity to 
minimize confusion and uncertainty by refusing to overturn Garcetti’s 
formalistic distinction between public employees speaking as either employees 
or citizens, ignoring the issue of whether voluntary testimony qualifies for First 
Amendment protection, and declining to explicitly define what is considered 
unprotected testimony within an employee’s job description. By not choosing 
to resolve so many existing discrepancies and leaving the current doctrine in a 
state of many interpretations, the Lane decision has left lower courts 
confounded. The decision further leaves government entities holding their 
breath by not providing notice of what conduct specifically goes awry of the 
Constitution, and it leaves employees in fear that speaking out will cost them 
their jobs.137 Therefore, even though the Court correctly extended protection to 
Lane, it still ultimately dropped the ball. 
 
 131. See id. at 2383 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the decision reached “require[d] little 
more than a straightforward application of Garcetti”). 
 132. Id. at 2379. 
 133. Id. at 2380. 
 134. See Press Release, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, SEIU’s Henry Comments on Supreme Court 
Ruling in Lane v. Franks (June 19, 2014), http://www.seiu.org/2014/06/seius-henry-comments-
on-supreme-court-ruling-in-la [http://perma.cc/5MEL-5NW7]. 
 135. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 136. See id. at 2383–84 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 137. See generally Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 52. 
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1. The Boundaries of an Employee’s “Ordinary Job Duties” Are Left 
Unresolved 
The Lane opinion did not address whether the First Amendment should 
protect the truthful testimony of a public employee where the testimony is 
included in the employee’s ordinary job duties. The majority opinion failed to 
acknowledge this explicitly, but the concurrence ensured to expressly reiterate 
that this is a question “for another day.”138 However, based on the policy 
rationales advanced by the Court, First Amendment application should not be 
precluded even when the testimony is part of the employee’s ordinary job 
duties because the obligation to testify truthfully arises from his or her status as 
a citizen.139 
The Lane Court made clear that providing “[s]worn testimony in judicial 
proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen . . . .”140 Why, 
then, should a police officer or crime scene technician141 be treated differently 
when they have the same “obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell 
the truth[?]”142 There is no significant distinction between Lane’s testimony 
and testimony provided to fulfill a job responsibility.143 Extending the 
protection beyond mere “speech as a citizen,” and instead protecting all 
truthful testimony, continues to meaningfully protect sworn testimony.144 
Furthermore, the obligation to be truthful remains. “[T]he government 
employer’s interest in hiring and firing does not outweigh the need for [public 
employees] to offer truthful sworn testimony without fear of repercussion.”145 
Most importantly, public employees who testify as a critical part of their 
employment duties should not be fearful that they could be terminated or 
retaliated against for providing truthful sworn testimony. Promoting such a 
policy is deeply troubling. 
 
 138. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We accordingly have no occasion to 
address the quite different question whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he 
testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities . . . The Court properly leaves [these] 
constitutional questions . . . for another day.”). 
 139. Id. at 2378–79. 
 140. Id. at 2379. 
 141. Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring). These are examples provided by the concurrence as 
public employees who regularly testify within their ordinary job duties. Id. at 2383 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 142. Id. at 2379 (“That obligation is distinct and independent from any separate obligations a 
testifying public employee might have to his employer.”). 
 143. Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 51; see also Garcetti v. Caeballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly the 
same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.”). 
 144. Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 51. 
 145. Id. at 52. 
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Additionally, job duties can be construed very broadly, giving public 
employers the potential power to construe employees’ job duties to include 
testifying to gain control over their speech.146 In addition to this concern, job 
responsibilities are ever-changing. Public employees should not have to guess 
whether something they express that is a matter of public importance will be 
considered “pursuant to” their “ordinary job duties”––and thus left unprotected 
by current First Amendment jurisprudence––or will instead be deemed to just 
“relate[] to” their job duties or be based on “information learned” within the 
course of their employment—and thus be constitutionally protected.147 This is 
a complex inquiry, one that is leaving lower courts and experts confounded, 
and that should not need to be performed by every public employee before 
testifying. 
The most viable argument that public employees should not be protected 
when testifying pursuant to their official duties is to avoid burdening local 
governments.148 However, is categorically infringing upon a public employee’s 
constitutional rights warranted solely to avoid placing a slight burden on 
government?149 A Supreme Court ruling that the First Amendment covers 
public employees when subpoenaed to testify, regardless of the testimony’s 
nature or its inclusion in their ordinary job duties, would undoubtedly protect 
public employees from retaliation from their employers.150 While this blanket 
constitutional coverage could also restrict a public employer’s ability to control 
its employee’s speech,151 it would make great strides in advancing the 
principles we, as a nation, value most: truthful testimony and constitutional 
rights. The Court places such heavy emphasis on the importance of protecting 
testimony but then proceeds to leave testimony within a public employee’s 
ordinary job duties subject to infringement. This differentiation should not 
exist. Further, the government could be protected in anomalous situations in 
which the employee’s testimony does unduly interfere with its interests as an 
employer through the final step of the inquiry: the balancing test.152 
 
 146. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 147. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 148. Brief for the International Municipal Lawyers Association, Inc. and the International 
Public Management Association for Human Resources as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 
Steve Franks at 4, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483). 
 149. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 150. Michael Lorden, Lane v. Franks: Public Employee Testimony and the First Amendment, 
LOYOLA U. CHI. EDUC. L. & POL’Y INST. F. 1, 10 (2014), http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/ 
centers/childlaw/childed/pdfs/2014studentpapers/Lorden.pdf [http://perma.cc/MJ75-6T7T]. 
 151. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (stating “government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter”). 
 152. The balancing test is utilized in Pickering as well as the final inquiry in Lane. Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380–
81. 
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2. The Distinction Between Speech as a Public Employee and Citizen 
Speech Is Undefined and Ambiguous 
Like distinguishing between speech in the ordinary course of one’s job 
duties and outside of one’s job duties, the distinction created between citizen 
speech and public employee speech makes little sense. “The notion that there is 
a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the 
course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”153 A citizen employed by the 
government is nonetheless a citizen,154 and that citizenship should be placed 
first, over the secondary identification as a public employee. Cashing a 
government paycheck is an inadequate justification to discount a speaker’s 
interest in commenting on a matter of public concern, and the First 
Amendment rests on something more.155 
The Supreme Court has even professed having the responsibility of 
ensuring “citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working 
for the government.”156 However, the Court is failing in upholding that 
responsibility to the citizens of our country who happen to be public 
employees. By limiting constitutional protections of public employees that are 
to be provided to all citizens, the Court is effectively depriving over twenty-
two million citizens of their fundamental right to free speech. Overall, the 
premise that a person could be speaking as a citizen in one regard, and as an 
employee in another, is a total fallacy. In order to restore all constitutional 
protections to public employees, the fantasy-based distinction between citizen 
speech and employee speech should also be entirely discarded. 
3. Voluntary Testimony Should Also Be Afforded First Amendment 
Protection 
So long as the testimony provided is truthful and not misleading, the First 
Amendment should bar employer discipline even in instances of voluntary 
testimony. While the employer certainly has an interest in controlling the 
information released by its employees, First Amendment protection should 
transcend merely subpoenaed testimony and also extend to testimony that is 
voluntarily provided. The policy rationales advanced by the Court on the 
importance of testimony157 apply whether the testimony provided is compelled 
or uncompelled. 
Public employees who witness corruption or possess valuable information 
obtained through their employment should be able to testify voluntarily 
without being hampered by fear of employment consequences. “[T]ruthful 
 
 153. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 419. 
 155. Id. at 428–29 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 156. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. 
 157. See supra Part IV(B)(1) for an explanation of the Court’s policy on protecting testimony. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
312 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:293 
speech is at the apex of the constitutional safeguard; [and] truthful speech 
about matters of public concern and the conduct of public officials [should be] 
especially protected; and that truthful testimony in court, in particular, may not 
serve as the basis for public sanction.”158 Stephen Kohn of the National 
Whistleblower Center further articulated, “The right of every American citizen 
to truthfully testify about criminal activities, including fraud in government 
contracting, is a cornerstone to democracy.”159 The Supreme Court even 
admits the importance of public employees disseminating information based on 
their unique positions. “There is considerable value . . . in encouraging, rather 
than inhibiting, speech by public employees. For ‘[g]overnment employees are 
often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they 
work.’”160 So much emphasis has been placed on the importance of a public 
employee’s ability to speak out on important matters to combat negative 
externalities being inflicted on the public, but the Court again falls short in 
implementing these policy rationales. 
Because of public employees’ intimate knowledge of the internal aspects 
of governmental affairs, they have the ability to testify to ideas and information 
that can hold the government accountable to the public.161 This is especially 
true considering the recent influx of revelations of government corruption.162 
However, when public employees hesitate to expose affairs of government and 
cooperate with the prosecution to bring the perpetrators to justice, society bears 
 
 158. Brief for the First Amendment Coalition as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483). 
 159. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Public Employees Are Protected from Retaliation 
for Testimony, WASH. POST (June 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-
court-rules-public-employees-are-protected-from-retaliation-for-testimony/2014/06/19/cd9df368-
f7bf-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html [http://perma.cc/7VMQ-4WQP]; see also Press 
Release, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, supra note 134 (“It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court 
didn’t go even further and establish a clear rule that truthful sworn testimony by public service 
workers should never be the basis for any retaliatory action by a public employer. Public service 
workers who are brave enough to stand up and speak out to improve public services should 
always be protected from retaliation.”). 
 160. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 
661, 674 (1994)). 
 161. Howard L. Zwickel, In Support of an Implied State Constitutional Free Speech Tort in 
Public Employment Retaliation Cases, 78 ALB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2015). 
 162. Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed U.S. 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1, A13 (covering the National Security Agency 
surveillance exposure by Edward Snowden); Emmarie Huetteman, Sentencing Set for Today for 
Manning in Leaks Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2013, at A14 (covering the sentencing of Bradley 
Manning who was behind the “WikiLeaks” scandal); Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, At VA Health 
Facilities, Whistleblowers Still Fear Retaliation, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/politics/at-va-health-facilities-whistleblowers-still-fear-retaliation/2015/03/05/a6 
774bda-b944-11e4-9423-f3d0a1ec335c_story.html [http://perma.cc/47J2-YUF9] (covering the 
VA hospital whistleblowers). 
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the costs through the loss of potentially crucial information that can reform 
government, promote efficiency, lead to greater transparency, and improve 
peoples’ lives.163 It is ineffective to rely on another government actor, such as a 
prosecutor, to issue a subpoena to procure a government employee’s testimony 
on matters of public concern. Therefore, the Court should take its own policy 
professions to heart164 and expand Lane’s holding to also protect public 
employees testifying voluntarily from fear of job reprisals. 
V.  THE PROPOSAL: SIMPLIFY THE INQUIRY AND RETURN TO PICKERING’S 
ROOTS 
In addition to leaving the doctrine in a disheveled state, the Lane Court 
missed the opportunity to simplify and correct the inquiry into whether a 
public employee’s speech is covered by the First Amendment. The Court needs 
to take a long look at its precedent, namely Garcetti, and correct the errors it 
has made in unnecessarily narrowing the constitutional protection afforded to 
public employees. To do this, I propose the Court revert to an inquiry similar 
to that used in Pickering and discard the imaginative distinctions employed by 
the Garcetti Court.165 
First, I suggest the Court completely eliminate the peculiar distinction 
between speech as an employee and speech as a citizen. This eradication 
includes ridding the test of the “official duties” doctrine that focuses on 
whether the speech is part of the employee’s ordinary job duties or not. Justice 
Souter similarly stated: 
  Nor is there any reason to raise the counterintuitive question whether the 
public interest in hearing informed employees evaporates when they speak as 
required on some subject at the core of their jobs. . . . The interest at stake is as 
much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s 
own right to disseminate it. . . . This is not a whit less true when an employee’s 
job duties require him to speak about such things: when, for example, a public 
auditor speaks on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when a 
building inspector makes an obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, or 
when a law enforcement officer expressly balks at a superior’s order to violate 
constitutional rights he is sworn to protect. (The [Garcetti] majority, however, 
 
 163. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“[P]ublic employees are often the 
members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their 
public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to 
speak on these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important 
public issues.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (“Exposing governmental 
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.”). 
 165. Id. at 416, 444. These distinctions include the difference between speech as an employee 
and speech as a citizen as well as distinguishing between speech if it is within the ordinary course 
of an employee’s job duties or not. Id. 
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places all these speakers beyond the reach of the First Amendment protection 
against retaliation.) Nothing, then, accountable on the individual and public 
side of the Pickering balance changes when an employee speaks “pursuant” to 
public duties.166 
Therefore, the analysis should instead focus on whether the speech is on a 
matter of public concern as the sole threshold question.167 If the speech 
surpasses that simple inquiry, the Pickering balancing test should then be 
applied. This balancing test depends on a careful balance “between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”168 If the 
government cannot support its burden and adequately justify why the 
employee should be treated differently based on its needs as an employer, the 
public employee’s speech should be afforded protection by the First 
Amendment.169 
The proposed test is superior to the current doctrine for a number of 
reasons. First and foremost, the proposed test is simple and straightforward. It 
removes the ambiguous and confounding dichotomy of “employee speech” 
versus “citizen speech.” It also eliminates the factual inquiry into what an 
employee’s ordinary job duties entail and minimizes the opportunity for 
employer manipulation in this regard.170 A test with a streamlined application 
will aid lower courts, and reduce the confusion that is currently occurring and 
has since the Garcetti decision.171 The test also provides better notice to 
employees and employers alike of what conduct falls within constitutional 
boundaries so they can adjust their behavior accordingly.172 
In addition to the administrative justifications, the proposed test also more 
effectively aligns with the Court’s own policy goals. With the ouster of many 
of the threshold inquiries and heavier focus on the balancing of employee and 
employer interests, the Court will have the opportunity to better promote its 
 
 166. Id. at 433 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 167. By removing this “pursuant to employment” threshold inquiry, at least when it comes to 
situations involving testimony, a plethora of previously disqualified, yet likely valid, situations 
then may proceed to the balancing test. 
 168. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 169. Brief for Alliance Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483) (“A public employee should receive full 
First Amendment protection when speaking on matters of public concern unless the employer can 
demonstrate that such speech disrupts implementation of the employer’s business operations.”). 
 170. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter suggested employers, 
in response to the Court’s decision in Garcetti, will be motivated to “expand stated job 
descriptions to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently protectable 
speech from First Amendment purview.” Id. 
 171. Fisk, supra note 6. 
 172. Baumgardner, supra note 7, at 52. 
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own professed policy goals. The Court has routinely made statements like 
“[t]he importance of public employee speech is especially evident in the 
context of . . . a public corruption scandal,”173 but the application of current 
doctrine has barred constitutional protection to public employees attempting to 
expose corruption in the course of their job duties or through voluntary 
testimony.174 This hypocrisy can be better avoided without the formalistic 
distinctions employed in the current doctrine and a more personalized inquiry 
into the situation at issue. While the proposed test may require more inquiry by 
the Court into the interests at stake, it is worth it, even necessary, in order to 
uphold the fundamental rights afforded to all citizens via the Constitution.175 
While the current test is in need of immediate mending, the Court will be 
unable to correct its errors until it grants certiorari to another case involving the 
same issue. However, when presented with the next opportunity, the Court 
should take a more policy-driven approach and entirely eliminate the “official 
duties” doctrine established by Garcetti. Instead, the inquiry should be 
centered on the importance of constitutional protection for public employees 
speaking out against their employers on matters of public concern.176 While the 
employer still has an “interest in controlling the operation of its 
workplaces,”177 this interest can be protected sufficiently by applying the 
Pickering balancing test. The proposed test protects both the interests of the 
employee and the interests of the employer without making public employees 
surrender their constitutional rights by way of their choice of employment. 
CONCLUSION 
While Lane v. Franks ultimately was decided correctly, the ruling was not 
a total victory for free speech in the way that it could have been.178 The 
Supreme Court erred in not going far enough in establishing new precedent 
 
 173. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014). 
 174. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413–24 (finding a district attorney who was retaliated against 
after exposing governmental misconduct via a written memorandum was not protected by the 
First Amendment because the memorandum was “pursuant to” his official job duties). 
 175. Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen constitutionally significant interests clash, 
resist the demand for winner-take-all; try to make adjustments that serve all of the values at 
stake.”). 
 176. Hudson Jr., supra note 14, at 38; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
(The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people”); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377 (“Speech 
by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment . . . . This 
remains true when speech concerns information related to or learned through public 
employment.”). 
 177. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. 
 178. David L. Hudson Jr., Court Limits Garcetti—at Least a Little, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (July 
8, 2014), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/court-limits-garcetti-at-least-a-little [http://perma. 
cc/8T5Z-C69S]. 
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and protections for public employees. Thus, Lane is merely the first of no 
doubt many decisions that will have to continue to clarify and refine Garcetti. 
There are some duties that arise out of citizenship that are more important 
than protecting a public employer’s interests. While there will certainly always 
be limitations or circumstances in which the First Amendment should not bar 
discipline by the employer, such as if the employee testifies falsely or 
misleadingly, the interests of the employee and his or her duties as a citizen 
should ascend the happenstance of their employer. The Lane Court was correct 
in declaring the First Amendment protects testimony of a public employee on a 
matter of public concern, which is not part of his or her job duties, from 
governmental discipline. However, this was the perfect opportunity for the 
Court to take a stance to further protect disadvantaged employees from their 
powerful government employers. The constitutional rights of any United States 
citizen should not be cast aside merely based on his or her public employment. 
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